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Abstract
The Russian government saw the 2008 global financial crisis as both a repudiation of western neoliberalism and as an ideal
opportunity to promote its own international economic leadership. Russia’s alternative vision encompasses multipolarity, finan-
cial nationalism and political illiberalism. These policies are symbiotic. The state uses its control over financial flows to build
and maintain political and economic power at home as well as to project its influence abroad, all justified with a strong dose
of great power nationalism positioning Russia as the Eurasian pole in an emerging multipolar world order. However, the Krem-
lin is doomed to frustration in its quest to assert international economic leadership. The Russian government has the ability to
shake up the existing international order but lacks the credibility, stability, or economic clout to lead the creation of a new
one. This has troubling implications for the future of international economic cooperation and reform, as Russia’s frustrations
have increasingly turned it in reactive and confrontational directions.
Policy Implications
• The west must devise a new strategy towards Russia – one that takes into account Russia’s search for great power status
and Eurasian leadership without at the same time undermining international economic cooperation or forcing Russia’s
smaller neighbors to choose sides.
• To this end, the US should play a more constructive and cooperative role in meaningful reform of the international finan-
cial architecture, especially as regards the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
• Given the mismatch between Russia’s aspirations and capabilities, the Russian government’s attempts to develop the Eura-
sian Economic Union (EEU), build up Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS) group, and devise alternative
nonwestern financial institutions should be understood as signs of economic weakness rather than strength.
• China, the US, and the EU should work together to discourage financial nationalism in Russia and protectionism in the
new EEU, policies that are potentially damaging for all sides.
The global financial crisis fundamentally challenged the
western-led international economic order. The insolvency of
major US financial institutions, the worldwide contagion
effects, and the existential crisis of the European project and
the euro revealed the inadequacies of existing financial reg-
ulatory regimes. On a deeper level, the crisis called into
question the ability of the western economic model – liberal
democracy, light-touch regulation, and an international
financial infrastructure guided by institutions like the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and fueled by US dollars – to
drive global prosperity and stability. Yet despite widespread
postcrisis dissatisfaction with the international order, con-
crete change at the international level has remained so ane-
mic that Eric Helleiner (2014) has referred to the ‘status quo
crisis’ and Colin Crouch (2011) has puzzled over the ‘strange
nondeath of neoliberalism.’
Russian political elites have been among the most critical
of the slow pace of systemic change. The Russian govern-
ment saw the global financial crisis not only as a repudia-
tion of western neoliberalism, but also as an ideal
opportunity to promote its own international leadership and
economic vision. Ever since the Soviet collapse, Russian
leaders had searched for a new global role for Russia. The
financial crisis and its aftermath gave the Russian govern-
ment under Vladimir Putin the chance to advance ideas on
global economic leadership that had long been percolating
in the Russian foreign policy community.
Russia’s alternative vision clusters around two major eco-
nomic themes: multipolarity and a state capitalism laced
with financial nationalism. Multipolarity is an updated inter-
pretation of the realist concept of spheres of influence, with
several ‘pole’ powers constructing regional multilateral insti-
tutions and relationships as alternatives to western-domi-
nated, universalist international institutions. Multipolarity
does not rule out cooperation with the west or with western
institutions, but insists that this occurs with the pole powers
on an equal footing and with a mutual respect for their dif-
ferent regional security and economic interests. Advocates
of multipolarity often give it a nationalist or civilizationalist
spin as well, arguing that less powerful states should gravi-
tate towards particular poles based on cultural and historical
affinities.
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State capitalism – government direction of the ‘command-
ing heights’ of the economy within a broader capitalist
framework – has a long international history and enjoyed a
global resurgence after the financial crisis (Bremmer, 2009).
Russia’s innovation has been to combine its state capitalism
with financial nationalism. Financial nationalist governments
actively use their financial systems and policies to benefit
national insiders, protect national wealth, promote national
sovereignty and exert international influence. A key element
of both multipolarity and financial nationalism is working to
diminish the hegemony of the US dollar in international
transactions, pricing, and reserves. This alternative vision has
a political dimension as well, breaking not only with western
economic liberalism but rejecting the liberal democratic
form of government in favor of ‘illiberal democracy’ or so-
called competitive authoritarianism. The Ukraine crisis and
western sanctions have exacerbated these tendencies,
entrenching multipolarity, financial nationalism and political
illiberalism as key touchstones in Russian foreign economic
policy making.
The rich literature on Russian economic policy after the
global financial crisis has focused on diverse issues such as
the Kremlin’s domestic economic policy responses to the cri-
sis (Cooper, 2011; Robinson, 2013), the need for economic
modernization (Aleksashenko, 2012; Connolly, 2013; Mau,
2015), the impediments to institutional reform (Malle, 2012;
Robinson, 2013), and the problems of natural resource-
based economic growth (Gaddy & Ickes, 2010; Aleksashenko,
2012). Rutland (2016) has highlighted the role of economics
in intellectual debates over Russian national identity, argu-
ing that the Putin government has promoted alternative
institutions such as the new Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)
and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS
nations) in order to support a domestic state corporatism
that could cut a middle path between national autarky and
international integration. But while the EEU and BRICS com-
plement Russia’s developmental plans, this element of Rus-
sia’s foreign economic strategy, we argue, is better seen as
reflecting not only domestic aims but also the Putin govern-
ment’s geostrategic goals.
This study explores how Russia’s foreign economic strat-
egy of multipolarity relates to financial nationalism and
political illiberalism at home. We move the discussion
beyond Russia’s domestic economic challenges and
approach the issue from a broader perspective, one that
integrates the Putin government’s perception of the crisis as
an opportunity to challenge the western-led international
economic order with its long-term strategy of positioning
Russia as an essential power broker in international politics.
In doing so, we offer an overarching picture of Russia’s alter-
native to the western order: it has interlocking domestic
and international components that together aim to advance
Russia’s bid for leadership in an evolving global economic
and political environment.
Finally, we argue that Russian leaders are doomed to frus-
tration in their quest to assert international economic lead-
ership. While Russia’s alternative vision may be compelling
to other states in the abstract, the messenger is less so. The
Russian government has the ability to shake up the existing
international order but lacks the credibility, stability, or eco-
nomic clout to lead the creation of a new one. This has
important implications for the future of international
economic cooperation and reform, as Russia’s frustrations
have increasingly turned it in reactive and confrontational
directions.
Multipolarity
Multipolarity represents the cornerstone of Russia’s foreign
policy vision, not just in the economic sphere but more
broadly as well. Certain elements of the Russian political
elite, particularly top-level bureaucrats in the security ser-
vices and foreign ministry, have systematically resisted US
hegemony in international relations since the early 1990s.
This group became known as the derzhavniki, pragmatic
great-power nationalists who advocated a more assertive
Russian role in the former Soviet sphere and in relations
with the west (Jackson, 2003). Multipolarity rose to the level
of foreign policy doctrine when former Foreign Intelligence
Service director Yevgeny Primakov became Foreign Minister
(1996–1998) and then Prime Minister (1998–1999) during
Boris Yeltsin’s second presidential term (Makarychev and
Morozov, 2011). Primakov argued that to remain a great
power, Russia needed to oppose North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO) enlargement in Eastern Europe and
strengthen its ties with China and India.
With former Federal Security Service head Vladimir
Putin’s subsequent rise to power, multipolarity became
entrenched as the ‘ideological background of foreign policy
thinking and practice’ in Russia (Makarychev & Morozov,
2011, p. 369). Putin brought many derzhavniki into his gov-
ernment – people like his former KGB colleagues Sergei
Ivanov and Nikolai Patrushev – and restored the high-level
status of the security services and military (Taylor, 2011).
Taylor notes the strong overlap between derzhavniki and
the siloviki, understood as officials with professional back-
grounds in security, military and law enforcement. Russia’s
desire for a multipolar world burst further into public view
when Putin criticized unipolarity at the 43rd Munich secu-
rity conference in 2007 and when then-President Dmitrii
Medvedev stated that in 2008 that ‘the world should be
multipolar’ and ‘a single pole is unacceptable’ (President of
Russia, 2008).
Indeed, before the global financial crisis Russia was
already developing close ties with other states interested in
challenging the US-led world order such as China, India,
Venezuela, Syria and Iran (Hancock, 2007). As the crisis hit,
Russia accelerated its drive to build a multipolar system of
international relations. Russia’s most recent Foreign Policy
Concept reveals how the Kremlin perceived the crisis’s effect
on Russia’s prospects for transforming the international
order:
The current stage of world development is charac-
terized by profound changes in the geopolitical
landscape largely provoked or accelerated by the
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global financial and economic crisis. International
relations are in the process of transition, the
essence of which is the creation of a polycentric
system of international relations.1
In the economic sphere, multipolarity has meant forging
stronger cooperation among the BRICS, opening to the Asia-
Pacific region and intensifying integration efforts in the
postSoviet space.
Building the BRICS
Russia’s engagement with the BRICS is a central tool of its
foreign economic agenda. The BRICS represent a core group
of emerging powers that offered a genuine critique of the
west’s supremacy, espoused mutual noninterference in
domestic politics, and offered Russia an opportunity to par-
ticipate in an international economic bloc in which it had a
nominally equal status. Consequently, the Russian govern-
ment invested significant effort in transforming the group
into more than just an informal talking shop. The central
Urals city of Yekaterinburg hosted the first meeting of the
BRICs Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 2008 and the first offi-
cial BRICs leaders’ summit in 2009. Since then, the BRICS
heads of states have met in a different country every year
and cooperation has continued to deepen. Under Russian
influence the BRICS agenda widened over time as well, mov-
ing from its initial focus on the international financial archi-
tecture to encompass socioeconomic development,
education and health, trade, agriculture, science and tech-
nology and international security. Putin (2012b) viewed the
BRICS as representing ‘a striking symbol of the transition
from a unipolar world to a more just world order’.
The BRICS initiative has been instrumental in promoting
Russia’s multipolarity agenda in several ways. First, it has
tempered Russia’s international isolation after the March
2014 Crimean crisis. No BRICS country has criticized Russia’s
annexation of Crimea or coercive policies in Ukraine. This
silence reinforces the Kremlin’s world view. Russia has posi-
tioned itself as the Eurasian regional leader whose policies
within that region should not be criticized by outside pow-
ers, and the other BRICS have behaved accordingly.
Second, Russia has used the BRICS to promote greater
inclusivity in the international financial architecture. The
BRICS countries collectively insisted that distributing power
more equitably and bringing a wide range of countries into
international governance structures would better reflect the
realities of the international system (Huotari & Hanemann,
2014). The BRICS countries were at the forefront in attempt-
ing to reform the IMF’s voting structure and share weights
in 2010. If the proposed changes were to be ratified, the
BRICS’s total voting shares in the IMF would rise to 10.3 per
cent. The US, the IMF’s main shareholder, has effectively
blocked ratification so far despite widespread international
approval of the proposal.2
Third, in response to such US recalcitrance Russia has
increasingly worked with the BRICS to build alternatives to
the current system. The final statement of the 2012 BRICS
summit in New Delhi reflected this shift in emphasis by
prominently calling for a broad-based international reserve
currency system, fleshing out an earlier agreement for the
countries’ development banks to provide credit to each
other in their national currencies, and proposing the cre-
ation of a BRICS development bank (Financial Times, 2012).
The BRICS launched the New Development Bank (NDB) dur-
ing its July 2015 summit in Ufa, Russia; the Bank’s home-
page states that it was founded ‘as an alternative to the
existing US-dominated World Bank and International Mone-
tary Fund.’3 Expected to make its first loans in 2016, the
NDB will have starting capital of $50 billion. The Russian
government has also signed on to China’s new and much
larger Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as the third-lar-
gest shareholder after China and India.
The success, efficiency, and prospects of the BRICS as an
international bloc are often debated (Cooper and Farooq,
2013; Goldstein, 2013; Chin, 2014; Huotari and Hanemann,
2014). Although the Russian government presents it as a
club of equals, in reality China’s GDP is larger than that of
the other member states combined, and while the Russian
ruble remains unattractive internationally the Chinese ren-
minbi has become one of the top five currencies in the
world (Noble, 2015). Moreover, while the BRICS share an
interest in reducing US influence, they have had difficulty
advancing a more positive agenda, as the birthing travails
of the NDB indicate. Nevertheless, the BRICS will likely
remain a significant platform for Russia’s attempts to ‘rebal-
ance’ the international financial system. Russia’s long-term
goal is to transform the group into a ‘full-fledged mechanism
of strategic cooperation on key international political and
economic issues,’ because ultimately the Kremlin believes
that ‘the association can potentially become a key element of
a new system of global governance, first of all in the financial
and economic areas’ (President of Russia, 2013).
The ‘Pivot to Asia’
The ‘Pivot to Asia’ represents another core element in Rus-
sia’s push for multipolarity. While it includes increased ties
to China both inside and outside the BRICS forum, it encom-
passes the Asia-Pacific region more broadly. Under Putin’s
leadership, for example, Russia has been an active partici-
pant in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summits
and consolidated its ties with ASEAN countries. As Russia’s
Foreign Policy Concept aspirationally argues, ‘the ability of
the West to dominate the world economy and politics con-
tinues to diminish. The global power and development
potential is now more dispersed and is shifting to the East,
primarily to the Asia-Pacific region.’
Russia’s Pivot to Asia reflects support among the Russian
elite for a more Asian-style statist developmental model
amidst the perceived global decline of western capitalism
and liberal values. Influential scholar and Kremlin adviser
Sergei Karaganov is the main advocate for re-orienting Rus-
sia’s foreign policy and trade ties towards Asia. Karaganov
(2013) has drawn attention to the ‘re-nationalization’ of
world politics and the central role that the Asia-Pacific
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region should play in Russia’s quest for multipolarity. Indeed,
Eurasian integration and opening to the Asia-Pacific would
be ‘Russia’s New Globalization,’ while an Asian development
path would offer Russia unique opportunities in a quickly
changing world (Barabanov and Bordachev, 2012). While
Russia’s liberal elite cautions that Russia’s economic future
still lies with the west (e.g., INSOR, 2011), this group has
been progressively marginalized in Russian foreign policy
circles, particularly since the Ukrainian crisis.
Beyond the intellectual debate, one practical reason for
the Pivot to Asia has been to attract investment to Siberia
and Russia’s Far East (Kuhrt, 2012). In Putin’s words, ‘in the
21st century, the vector of Russia’s development will be the
development of the East. Siberia and the Far East represent
enormous potential’ (President of Russia, 2012). To advance
that goal, Putin’s government established the Ministry for
the Development of the Far East in May 2012 and chose
Vladivostok, host city for the 2012 APEC summit, as the sym-
bolic center for launching the Far East’s economic develop-
ment and integration with the Asia-Pacific region.
However, despite aspirations to use these growing Asian
ties to facilitate technology transfer and modernization, in
reality Russia’s opening to Asia has been built primarily on
its energy resource abundance. The Ukrainian crisis has
intensified this development, with Russian economic uphea-
val and western sanctions leading the government to sign
two concessionary energy deals with China. In May 2014
Russia signed a long-delayed gas deal worth $400 billion
during President Putin’s visit to Beijing and then signed
another in November to supply natural gas from western
Siberia to China. In October 2014 the two governments
signed a further 38 agreements on energy, trade, and
finance that deepened their resource-based economic coop-
eration and provided for a currency swap of 150 billion ren-
minbi to reduce their mutual dependence on the US dollar.
While these agreements may help the Kremlin diversify its
energy export markets, in the long run Russia’s Pivot to Asia
may also secure Russia’s one-dimensional role as raw materi-
als supplier to a more economically diverse and vibrant
China. Russian leaders are not unaware of the risks, but
seem willing to accept them.
The EEU
Russia has positioned itself as the Eurasian pole of a multi-
polar world by leading economic re-integration efforts in
the postSoviet space. In 2009, Russian, Belarusian and
Kazakh leaders agreed to form a Customs Union within the
already existing but limited Eurasian Economic Community
(EurAsEc). The Customs Union came into effect in 2010, with
Russia’s tariffs largely becoming the external tariffs of all
union members. In 2012, the Customs Union became a
Common Economic Space (CES) targeting the free move-
ment of goods, labor, capital and services. Putin (2011)
lauded the CES as a precursor to an eventual Eurasian
Union, arguing that ‘only together do our countries have
the ability to become leaders of global growth and civiliza-
tional progress.’ As he noted at the time:
We took the integration achievements in Europe as
our reference model. We do have a few advantages
of our own though. . . we have the Russian lan-
guage that unites us as a natural common lan-
guage of interstate communication, and this is a
huge advantage. Furthermore, the infrastructure
system – railways, energy sector infrastructure, avia-
tion links – though we consider it still in need of
further development, lays a solid base on which to
build integration. . . Indeed, the situation is such
that the heavens themselves incite us to integrate,
and so this is what we are doing.4
In January 2015 the CES became the EEU, an entity
modeled on the EU and encompassing the original three
states plus Armenia and, as of August 2015, Kyrgyzstan;
Russia expects Tajikistan to join as well. The Russian gov-
ernment has presented this latest Eurasian integration pro-
ject as a natural postcrisis development, a response to the
revealed dangers of being too dependent on western
financial structures (Krickovic, 2014). According to Putin,
regional groupings would have been better placed to
weather the global economic turmoil, and deeper Eurasian
integration will enable member states to have a stronger
voice in the global economy. As the western powers
demonstrated their inability to provide global collective
goods, Russia would take on the responsibility of regional
leadership (Krickovic, 2014). Russian political elites like Kon-
stantin Kosachev, the chairman of the international affairs
committee of the Federation Council, believe that the EEU
will become the platform through which the postSoviet
states will talk to the EU (TASS, 2015). The EEU is intended
to counter the EU’s Eastern Partnership and to boost Rus-
sia’s global stance by making it the leader of a key regio-
nal economic organization (Shumylo-Tapiola, 2012; Cadier,
2014).
Restoring Russian dominance in the postSoviet space had
long been on the agenda of Russia’s derzhavnik foreign pol-
icy elite. As Jackson (2003) has shown, even in the early
1990s this group had proposed that Russia re-unite the post-
Soviet states through economic integration and security
cooperation arrangements far deeper than those of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States created in December
1991. As a representative of this group, Putin worked
towards increasing Russia’s economic integration with other
postSoviet states from the early stages of his presidency. In
2004, Viktor Khristenko, then deputy prime minister and now
head of the Eurasian Economic Commission (the Eurasian
equivalent of the European Commission), argued that only
Eurasian integration could allow Russia to project its eco-
nomic power in world markets, asserting that it would help
the countries to consolidate their economic potential as well
as ‘broaden opportunities and improve competitive capacity’
in trade with third countries (Khristenko, 2004). When Med-
vedev said, ‘there are regions in which Russia has privileged
interests’ and with which Russia had ‘special historical rela-
tions,’ he echoed the near-consensus Russian attitude
towards its postSoviet neighbors (President of Russia, 2008).
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This Russian-led integration has been both protectionist
and coercive. Despite joining the World Trade Organization
in 2012 Russia’s tariffs remained relatively high for the region,
and this has extended to its Eurasian integration agreements.
For example, when Russia’s tariffs became those of the Cus-
toms Union, it increased Kazakhstan’s tariffs from an average
of 6.7 per cent to 11.1 per cent on an unweighted basis (Isa-
kova et al., 2013). More importantly, Russia has used eco-
nomic coercion to prod recalcitrant states into joining, which
reflects its increasingly zero-sum perception of foreign eco-
nomic relations. The Russian government has systematically
threatened and sanctioned postSoviet states wary of its eco-
nomic integration project, especially those that pursued
Association Agreements with the EU such as Moldova, Geor-
gia and Ukraine. In fact, the Ukrainian crisis broke out in
November 2013 when former President Viktor Yanukovych
announced under Russian pressure that he would no longer
pursue an EU Association Agreement. After the new Por-
oshenko government signed the EU agreement in July 2014,
Russia blocked key Ukrainian exports. Russia had previously
restricted imports from Moldova and Georgia, and had
deported illegal migrants from those countries as punish-
ment for noncooperation (Popescu, 2014). Russia has also
threatened to send illegal Tajik migrants out of the country if
Tajikistan’s government did not acquiesce to integration on
Russian terms (Parshin, 2015).
Russia’s main source of leverage, though, has been natu-
ral gas prices. Since the Soviet collapse many neighboring
states have relied on Russian gas sold at below-market rates,
and Russian threats to raise these rates or cut supplies have
teeth. Not long after Yanukovych’s ouster Russia’s state gas
monopoly Gazprom raised Ukraine’s gas prices and briefly
cut off supplies for nonpayment, echoing similar actions
after Ukraine’s pro-European Orange Revolution in 2004. In
January 2007 Russia doubled gas prices to Georgia and even
cut supplies to its closest ally in the region, Belarus, for
three days, which was interpreted as a clear sign of Putin’s
determined stance to ensure regional elites’ loyalty to Russia
(Balmaceda, 2007).
However, the EEU is unlikely to have enough economic
firepower to boost Russia into a meaningful global role as
a strong economic pole in a multipolar system. The EEU’s
members and potential members are far less wealthy than
Russia, and the EEU is not well integrated economically. As
of February 2013, Russia’s key postSoviet partner states
accounted for only 14 per cent of its foreign trade (Car-
neiro, 2013). A 2013 EBRD study of the Customs Union
found that its trade creation effects were small while its
trade diversion effects were more significant, testifying to
its relatively zero-sum nature and boding ill for trade-dri-
ven growth in the EEU (Isakova et al., 2013). Less than 3
per cent of Russia’s net outward foreign direct investment
went to its current EEU partners between 2010–14, and
only 3.6 per cent went to all the nonBaltic postSoviet
states combined (Central Bank, 2015). All of the EEU mem-
bers, including Russia, import most of their high value-
added products from more advanced economies (Inozemt-
sev, 2011).
Eurasian integration efforts have often been expensive for
Russia as well. Russia has offered carrots along with the
sticks, providing cheaper natural gas and other incentives to
postSoviet states such as Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan in
exchange for their cooperation in Russia’s regional integra-
tion schemes. For example, in July 2013, Gazprom took over
Kyrgyzstan’s small gas pipeline network for a symbolic $1
and in return assumed Kyrgyzstan’s debts of $40 million
(Ott, 2014). In April 2015, Russia lowered Armenian gas
prices after it joined the EEU (Armenpress, 2015). On a
grander scale, Inozemtsev (2014) argues that Moscow’s
efforts to keep Belarus within its orbit cost it some $70 bil-
lion from 2000 to 2013. Russia had to make major conces-
sions to Belarus and Kazakhstan even when forming the
original Customs Union (Barabanov, 2012). In short, Russia’s
attempt to be a regional economic leader has yielded luke-
warm and pricey followers. While East European states clam-
ored to join the EU often at real costs to themselves, Russia
has often had to prod other postSoviet states to join the
EEU.
The ongoing Ukraine crisis has further tested the Eurasian
alliance. Events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine sent a strong
signal to Russia’s neighbors that the Kremlin might be will-
ing to compromise their sovereignty as well, and the
December 2014 Russian currency crisis had ripple effects
throughout the region. Russia and the EEU remain popular
among citizens of the EEU member states, but regional lead-
ers have grown more cautious. For example, Belarusian Pres-
ident Lukashenko proposed resuming trade with Russia in
US dollars, restored customs checkpoints between the two
countries, verbally defended Ukraine’s territorial integrity,
and began to promote the Belarusian over the Russian lan-
guage. As he bluntly stated, ‘Yes, Russia is our brother and
our friend. But you see how they sometimes behave. There-
fore we need to be sure to diversify, whatever the cost’
(Hille, 2015).
Karaganov and his colleagues (2015) have argued that we
are witnessing ‘the birth of the Central Eurasian Moment,’
one that will make the region a nonwestern developmental
powerhouse thanks to cooperation between the EEU and
China’s new ‘One Belt, One Road’ project. Krickovic (2014)
has similarly argued that the EEU is a pragmatic collective
response to power shifts in the global economy and could
increase Russia’s bargaining power vis-a-vis the west. But as
falling world oil prices and western sanctions mire Russia
ever more deeply in the stagflation trap, it can offer less to
its neighbors. If Russia’s EEU partners come to see their alli-
ance as a threat rather than a boon to their long-term politi-
cal and economic security, Russia may find itself a pole that
repels rather than attracts, giving the EU and China the
opportunity to draw the states of Russia’s near abroad into
their orbits instead.
Financial nationalism
Playing its desired postcrisis leadership role required Russia
not only to build new transnational economic institutions
and alliances, but also to present an attractive domestic
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development model to the outside world. Without a robust
economy, Russia could not convincingly make a claim to
economic leadership or draw others into its orbit via the
soft power of economic influence. Unlike the broad appeal
of multipolarity, however, Russian elites had comparatively
more contested and less coherent visions for domestic eco-
nomic development, visions ranging from liberal open-mar-
ket policies to autarkic statism. In practice Vladimir Putin’s
government moved to institute state capitalism soon after
his ascent to power, progressively bringing big business
under government sway, but without initially compromising
the country’s economic openness.
After the global financial crisis, most Russian elites came
to agree that Russia needed to modernize and diversify its
economy away from natural resource dependence in order
to achieve stable domestic growth and increase its eco-
nomic influence internationally. The resulting conundrum
was how to do so while simultaneously maintaining the
state’s ability to guide Russia’s development. As Putin put it
in a major policy statement, ‘We need to find solutions to
overcome our unilateral technological dependence. . . the
successful experience of economic modernization in coun-
tries like Korea and China shows that a push in the right
directions from the government is necessary’ (Putin, 2012a).
While not fully articulated and occasionally contested, we
argue that the modernization imperative and Russia’s desire
to be the Eurasian pole in a multipolar system gave rise to a
set of policies within the state capitalist system that we call
financial nationalism.
Financial nationalism is an economic strategy that
employs financial levers – including monetary policy, cur-
rency interventions, and other methods of interaction with
local and international financial systems – to promote the
nation’s unity, autonomy and identity (Johnson and Barnes,
2015). It differs from economic nationalism in that it does
not necessarily imply trade protectionism or withdrawal
from global commodity markets (Pryke, 2012). Instead,
financial nationalism puts an emphasis on the state’s use
of domestic financial resources and institutions – both
public and private – to achieve state developmental goals
and to enhance the state’s relative autonomy within the
international system. All of this is done in the name of the
nation, in which state financial activism and national patri-
otism become conflated. While financial nationalist senti-
ment has had significant support in Russia since at least
the mid-1990s, the global financial crisis, western sanctions,
and the December 2014 ruble crisis progressively pushed it
to the forefront of Russian domestic economic policy.
Financial nationalism requires monetary sovereignty. This
can include promoting the national currency both domesti-
cally and internationally, as well as eschewing government
accumulation of foreign debt. The Russian government had
already undertaken an extensive de-dollarization campaign
within Russia before the global financial crisis, touting the
patriotic virtues of using the national currency (Johnson,
2008). It has since enhanced this agenda by issuing primarily
ruble-based debt, encouraging banks to convert foreign cur-
rency loans into rubles, and embarking on a concerted
effort to promote rubles rather than US dollars in export
contract quotation and settlement (Suvorov, 2014). Putin
has further noted that ‘we need to be very careful about
taking government loans. . . large debt always means a par-
tial loss of national sovereignty. It creates a situation
wherein any deterioration of the economic environment
makes the country dependent on investors, international
organizations, and lender nations, which then dictate what
measures a government must take’ (Putin, 2012a). Preserv-
ing monetary sovereignty has also involved stockpiling for-
eign exchange reserves, which rose from their post1998
crisis low of $11 billion to a high of almost $600 billion in
early 2008. Indeed, before Russia’s takeover of Crimea Putin
was reported to have asked his aides if Russia’s reserves
were enough to buffer the country from potential western
sanctions; when assured that they were, Putin proceeded
with his annexation plans (Pismennaya et al., 2014).
Russian leaders have promoted ruble internationalization
as a way to diversify the international monetary system and
increase Russian financial leverage as well. While some
claimed that the ruble had a future as a world currency,
most agreed that the ruble should become the dominant
currency in the postSoviet region (Johnson, 2013). Although
Russia’s EEU partners have viewed these efforts with skepti-
cism, this has not deterred the Russian government from
keeping the issue on the agenda in various ways (e.g., see
Russia Today, 2015). One of Russia’s first acts upon assuming
control of Crimea was to replace the Ukrainian hryvnia with
the Russian ruble (TASS, 2014). The Russian-supported sepa-
ratist Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia use
the ruble as well, as does increasingly the embattled Don-
bass region in eastern Ukraine.
Financial nationalism further means showing preference
to national insiders and financial institutions over foreign
ones. This can include discrimination against foreign banks,
preferential financing for domestic companies, as well as
building and promoting domestic state-owned banks. Since
the 1990s Russia has restricted foreign bank activity within
its borders, not allowing foreigners to buy majority shares
in Russian banks undergoing privatization and licensing
foreign banks to operate only in limited ways and num-
bers. In addition, Russia never privatized its immense state
savings bank (Sberbank) or the former Soviet foreign trade
bank (Vneshtorgbank). After Russia’s 1998 financial crisis
led to multiple bank collapses and bailouts, state control
over the sector increased significantly. Currently the five
largest Russian banks are state controlled and dwarf the
rest of the sector; only three foreign bank subsidiaries are
in the top 20.5 The government employs the state-owned
banks as investment tools, and runs Vneshekonombank as
a traditional internal development bank. The government’s
current anticrisis plan involves recapitalization for state-
owned and insider commercial banks, as well as additional
support for Vneshekonombank’s development activities
(Myers, 2014; BNE, 2015).
Of course, many governments act to protect their own
financial institutions. What makes Russia’s financial national-
ism more notable is that the state has also targeted
© 2016 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2016) 7:2
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domestic individuals and institutions with foreign financial
ties as a disloyal fifth column. Since the global financial crisis
it has engaged in a policy referred to as ‘de-offshorization’
of the elite, requiring government officials and business
leaders to keep their personal wealth at home rather than
in foreign bank accounts and foreign property. Russia has in
essence imposed a financial loyalty test, in which the Putin
government has punished elites possessing overseas finan-
cial resources as well as domestic NGOs receiving financial
support from overseas (Putin, 2012b).6 The government has
also imposed a punitive tax rate on earnings from foreign-
registered companies controlled by Russian nationals (Barau-
lina et al., 2015). As Dmitri Trenin wryly observed, Putin
‘publicly commended the US for sanctioning members of
the Russian political and economic elites because it helped
him with his own effort to nationalize them’ (Trenin, 2014,
p. 14).
Financial nationalism also involves using monetary policy
to pursue state-led development and foreign policy goals.
For this reason, financial nationalists distrust independent
central banks. While the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) enjoys
nominal legal independence and is one of the last bastions
of economic liberalism, in practice the Putin government
has used the CBR to support its economic and foreign policy
on multiple occasions, a trend that has accelerated markedly
since the Ukraine crisis. Credible reports indicated that the
CBR withdrew over $100 billion in US Treasury bills from the
US Federal Reserve before the Crimean referendum, in antic-
ipation of possible sanctions (BBC Monitoring, 2014). At the
same time, the CBR provided over $27 million in cash to
sanctions-targeted SMP Bank, owned by close Putin associ-
ates (RosBusinessConsulting, 2014). After the December
2014 ruble crash, the government imposed informal capital
controls, prevailed upon the largest state-owned exporters
to sell foreign currency reserves to support the ruble, and
insisted that future currency sales be coordinated with the
government (Farchy, 2014). The Russian government also
pressed the CBR to rebuild the foreign-exchange stockpile it
spent to defend the ruble during the currency crisis, a policy
which supports state-controlled export companies and mon-
etary sovereignty but plays havoc with the CBR’s preferred
aim to control inflation.
Finally, financial nationalism implies turning away from
international financial institutions dominated by the west.
Although Russian skepticism of the IMF is longstanding, this
skepticism has grown to encompass international financial
institutions more broadly. For example, after Visa and
Mastercard briefly denied service in March 2014 to Russian
banks under US sanctions, the Russian government passed
legislation mandating the creation of a separate national
payments system and demanding that Visa and Mastercard
deposit millions of dollars with the CBR in order to continue
operations in the country. The CBR dutifully established the
NSPK (National Card Payment System) in June 2014 and
began processing payments through it in February 2015, an
expensive proposition justified in the name of national
financial autonomy and security (Krivobok, 2014). After
receiving repeated sovereign credit-rating downgrades the
Russian government also declared that it would break ties
with international ratings agencies and start its own national
ratings agency instead (Russia Today, 2014). Legislation
adopted in July 2015 charged the CBR with creating the
new Credit Rating Agency of the Russian Federation by
year’s end.7 The Putin government envisions the spread of
these institutions to the EEU as well, as further means
through which Russia can extend its financial influence
abroad.
The Russian government pairs this financial nationalism
with political illiberalism, a governance system that has vari-
ously been called illiberal democracy, managed democracy,
competitive authoritarianism and patronal presidentialism
by scholars, and most famously sovereign democracy by for-
mer Kremlin chief ideologist Vladislav Surkov (Zakaria, 1997;
Wegren and Konitzer, 2007; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Hale,
2005; Surkov, 2009). The chief characteristics of this political
system include managed elections, state dominance over
the media, demonization of regime opponents, conflation of
the state and the nation in government discourse, and an
extensive political patronage network (financed by Russia’s
resource wealth) with the president sitting at the top of the
so-called ‘power vertical.’ Many Russian elites present this
system as a more historically and culturally appropriate
political model for Eurasia than western liberal democracy,
which was perhaps unfairly but quite thoroughly discredited
in the eyes of the Russian public during the turbulent Yelt-
sin era. For its part, the Russian public has supported Putin’s
political leadership, rewarding him with approval ratings of
89 per cent as of June 2015.8 The public generally
applauded his efforts to restore Russian influence interna-
tionally, welcomed the annexation of Crimea, and, in keep-
ing with Russian state media messaging, identified the west
as the aggressor in trying to pull Ukraine away from Russia,
keeping Russia economically weak, and fomenting antiRus-
sian sentiment in neighboring states.
Russia’s power paradox
The Putin government’s policies of multipolarity, financial
nationalism, and political illiberalism are symbiotic, with the
state using its control over financial flows to build and
maintain power and to project its influence abroad, all justi-
fied with a strong dose of great power nationalist sentiment.
Western sanctions imposed after the Crimea takeover have
further shifted power away from Russia’s liberals, tilting the
balance toward the derzhavniki and emboldening formerly
marginalized economists such as Sergei Glazyev who have
long advocated financial nationalism and regional economic
integration (Glazyev, 2014; Rutland, 2016). Multipolarity,
financial nationalism and political illiberalism as concepts
also hold fairly wide appeal in the postcrisis world, as coun-
tries as diverse as Hungary and China demonstrate. It is
unsurprising that policies to protect national finance yet
encourage regionally based economic integration would
seem attractive to many after the revealed weaknesses and
inequities of the international financial system and the
ongoing tribulations of the euro.
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Nevertheless, Russian elites have become increasingly
frustrated in their bid to position Russia as a Eurasian pole
and attractive model of nonliberal development in the
postcrisis international system. The most recent Pew Global
Attitudes poll found that few countries viewed Russia or
Vladimir Putin favorably (Stokes, 2015). In order for Russia
to successfully promote itself as a systemic pole, it must
be seen as an attractive, politically stable economic power-
house with a sustainable development model. However, far
from serving as a potential engine of development, Russia’s
illiberal political-economic system represents the major
obstacle to the country’s modernization (Johnson, 2012;
Ledeneva, 2013). By privileging a small network of loyal
domestic elites and informal rules, it promotes economic
uncertainty and stifles innovation. Russia’s economy has stag-
nated since the global financial crisis, and as high capital flight
and low ruble savings figures suggest, while Russians may
support their president even they do not necessarily trust
their country’s economic institutions.
This gap between Russia’s economic leadership aspira-
tions and capabilities threatens regional stability in Eurasia
and the postcrisis international order more broadly. The
derzhavniki view Russia as the inevitable Eurasian pole
because of its regional economic and military superiority, its
large US dollar reserves, and its vast natural resources. But
Russia’s economic instability and its coercive actions in
Ukraine and elsewhere have frightened even its EEU allies,
while China’s increasingly assertive economic role in Central
Asia and within the BRICS threatens to marginalize Russia in
its own backyard and on the world stage. Indeed, despite
conciliatory noises from both sides, China’s latest ‘One Belt,
One Road’ strategy for expanding its influence in Central
Asia seems destined to conflict with the Russian govern-
ment’s ambitions for the EEU.
The Ukraine crisis and western sanctions have made Rus-
sia’s modernization and diversification goals even more dis-
tant. First Deputy Prime Minister Shuvalov has optimistically
mused, ‘We have experience, like with how South Africa
developed under sanctions or how Chile developed in difficult
conditions. Is it possible to create a modern economic system
amid political difficulties? The answer – it is’ (Interfax, 2015).
But as Russia has become progressively cut off from western
financing and technologies, as Putin’s inner circle has shrunk
to exclude most liberal economic voices, and as economic
problems brought on by sanctions and low oil prices threaten
Putin’s ability to keep adequate resources flowing through his
patronage network, such optimism rings hollow.
At the same time, western sanctions have reinforced the
power of the derzhavniki. As much of the Putin government
and Russian public revel in antiAmericanism, Russian eco-
nomic liberals who had previously championed engagement
with global political and economic structures are being
squeezed out. Ultimately, the sanctions jeopardize Russia’s
hard-won integration in the international financial system,
integration that is vital for sustained Russian economic
development. The resulting situation challenges not only
Russia and its neighbors, but also the US and the EU. The
west must devise a new strategy towards Russia – one that
takes into account Russia’s search for great power status
and leadership in Eurasia without at the same time under-
mining international economic cooperation or forcing Rus-
sia’s smaller neighbors to choose sides.
Notes
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